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ABSTRACT
Secure Device Pairing is the process of bootstrapping a se-
cure communication between two previously unassociated
devices over a wireless communication channel. The human-
imperceptible nature of wireless communication coupled with
the lack of a prior security context and a common trust in-
frastructure open the door for Man-in-the-Middle (aka Evil
Twin) attacks. To mitigate these attacks, some interesting
methods have been proposed, each requiring a certain de-
gree of user involvement in the device pairing process. In
all of them, the user assists in authenticating information
exchanged over the wireless channel via another human-
perceptible auxiliary channel, e.g., visual, acoustic or tac-
tile.
In this paper, we present the results of the rst compre-
hensive and comparative study of eleven notable secure de-
vice pairing methods. Usability measures included: task
performance times, ratings on the System Usability Scale
(SUS), task completion, and perceived security. Study sub-
jects were controlled for age, gender and prior experience
with device pairing. We present the overall study results
and identify methods that are particularly problematic for
certain classes of users as well as those that are best-suited
for various device congurations. This work is important,
since it sheds light on usability in one of the very few settings
where a wide range of users is faced with security techniques.
It is also timely, since research on secure device pairing has
reached maturity.
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication is very popular today and is likely
to remain so in the future. In particular, medium- and short-
range wireless communication methods (such as Bluetooth,
WiFi, Zigbee and WUSB) are becoming ubiquitous on per-
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sonal devices, such as cell-phones, headsets, cameras and
memory sticks. In the past, wireless devices communicated
mostly with the (wired) infrastructure, e.g., cell-phones to
base stations or laptops to access points. However, mod-
ern devices increasingly need to communicate among them-
selves, e.g., a Bluetooth headset with a cell-phone, a mem-
ory stick with a PDA, a PDA with a wireless printer, or a
wireless access point with a laptop.
The convenience of seamless mobility and ubiquitous con-
nectivity that comes with personal wireless devices is tem-
pered by increased security and privacy risks. Compared
to its wired counterpart, wireless communication is subject
to easier eavesdropping and other attacks. Specically, the
process of setting up an initial security context between wire-
less devices is prone to so-called Man-in-the-Middle (MiTM),
also known as Evil Twin attacks. Countering MiTM attacks
requires the channel to be authenticated. However, an au-
thenticated channel requires either a pre-shared secret or a
common trust infrastructure, neither of which exists (since
that is precisely what secure device pairing aims to achieve).
The main challenge in secure device pairing stems from
two factors: (1) inherent exposure to attacks and (2) hu-
man imperceptibility of wireless channels. Traditional cryp-
tographic measures for establishing secure communication
(such as authenticated key exchange protocols) are unsuit-
able for the problem at hand, since the communication chan-
nel is not authenticated and unfamiliar devices have no prior
security context or common point of trust. Among a mul-
titude of device types and their manufacturers, there is no
common security infrastructure and none is likely to materi-
alize in the near future. This is due in part to the diversity of
devices, lack of standards, and glacial progress of standard-
ization bodies. However, there is wide-spread acceptance on
the part of the device manufacturers and the research com-
munity that some form of human user involvement in the
secure device pairing process is unavoidable [32].
One natural and well-explored research direction aimed
at addressing the device pairing problem is the use of auxil-
iary\out-of-band"(OOB) channels, which are both perceiv-
able and manageable by the human user. An OOB channel
takes advantage of human sensory capabilities to authenti-
cate human-imperceptible information exchanged over the
wireless channel (that may be subject to MiTM attacks).
OOB channels can be realized using acoustic, visual and
tactile senses. The main idea is that a human-perceivableOOB channel, unlike the main wireless channel, does not
allow an MiTM attack to remain undetected.
Since some degree of human involvement is unavoidable,
the usability of the methods based on OOB channels is cru-
cial. Also, since a typical OOB channel is low-bandwidth,
the amount of information transferred over it needs to be
minimized for reasons of both usability and eciency. Most
pairing methods (see Section 2) typically involve sending a
few bits (e.g., 15) over the OOB channel to achieve rea-
sonable security. However, some devices (e.g., Bluetooth
headsets and wireless access points) have very limited hard-
ware capacities and poor or very rudimentary user inter-
faces, making it a challenge to communicate even a few bits.
In the last decade, many secure device pairing methods
have been proposed, each claiming certain advantages and
exhibiting certain shortcomings. As described in more de-
tail in Section 2.2, their fundamental distinguishing char-
acteristics are the nature of the underlying OOB channel,
and assumptions regarding the user interface and the device
equipment.
Though some of the proposed methods have been eld-
tested on their own (e.g, [29, 22]), no comprehensive and
comparative usability evaluation of these methods has been
performed until very recently. Kumar, et al. [17] conducted
the rst experimental study comparing a large number of
prominent methods.
1 While valuable, this study and its
results have several important problems though:
Participants: The set of participants was very narrow,
comprising mostly young (and male) graduate students
intimately familiar with the newest technology.
Administration: The test administrators were also the
developers of some of the tested methods. This under-
mines the perceived neutrality of the study.
Uniformity: Although the sequence of methods tested by
each subject was random, it was not controlled (over-
all) for uniform distribution.
Attacks: Each method was tested multiple times with dif-
ferent (but somewhat predictable) errors that simu-
lated MiTM attacks. This resulted in subject fatigue
and annoyance as well as in a learning eect, since sub-
jects started to predict the set of error scenarios to be
tested.
Length: The study was performed in three batches due
to the excessive number of error scenarios for each
method. However, there was a break of several days
between batches, which is too long for subjects to ef-
fectively remember the methods tested in the prior
batch(es).
Expertise: The authors of [17] are primarily security re-
searchers without the level of HCI expertise necessary
to identify (and avoid) some of the issues mentioned
above and, more generally, to conduct an in-depth ex-
ploration of usability factors.
More importantly, the results of [17], though valuable, leave
the usability factors of various device pairing methods rather
1As discussed in Section 2.2 below, the study in [33] com-
pared four methods; however, these methods were essentially
minor variations of each other.
unclear. This is because [17] focused more on security than
on usability; the only noteworthy usability insight was ob-
tained by asking participants to rank the perceived diculty
of tested methods, from easy to hard within each pre-dened
group. However, participants' post-hoc perception is only
one of several usability indicators.
In general, we observe that many (if not most) secure
device pairing methods have been developed by security re-
searchers who, not surprisingly, are experts in security and
not usability or HCI. What seems simple and user-friendly
to a seasoned security professional might not be either to an
average user. Non-specialist users are often initially clueless
about manipulating new devices and have insucient under-
standing of security issues and the very meaning of user par-
ticipation in secure device pairing. This disconnect between
developers and average users as well as several aforemen-
tioned shortcomings of [17], serve as the chief motivation for
the study presented in this paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2,
reviews prominent secure device pairing methods. Section 3
discusses our criteria for selecting the candidate methods.
The rest of the paper describes the design of our experiments
(Section 4), presents its results (Section 5) and discusses
their implications, with respect to methods as well as in the
context of age, experience and gender.
2. BACKGROUND
As background for our study, we briey describe relevant
cryptographic protocols and secure device pairing methods
that use these protocols. (This section can be skipped with
no lack of continuity by those already familiar with secure
device pairing). The term cryptographic protocol denotes the
entire interaction involved, and information exchanged, in
the course of the pairing method. The term pairing method
refers to the pairing process as viewed by the user, i.e., user
actions. As discussed below, a given single cryptographic
protocol can be realized using many pairing methods.
2.1 Cryptographic Protocols
A very simple protocol for device pairing was rst sug-
gested in [1]: devices A and B exchange their respective
public keys pkA and pkB over the insecure channel, and the
corresponding hashes H(pkA) and H(pkB) over the OOB
channel. Although non-interactive, the protocol requires
H() to be a (weakly) collision-resistant hash function and
thus needs at least 80 bits of OOB data in each direction.
MANA protocols [9] reduce the size of OOB messages to
k bits while limiting attacker's success probability to 2
 k.
However, these protocols require a stronger assumption on
the OOB channel: the adversary is assumed to be incapable
of delaying or replaying any OOB messages.
An alternative approach uses so-called Short Authenti-
cated Strings (SAS). The rst SAS protocol was proposed
in [34]. It limits attack probability to 2
 k for a k-bit OOB
channel, even when the adversary can delay and/or replay
OOB messages. This protocol utilizes commitment schemes
(which can be based upon hash functions such as SHA-2)
and requires four rounds of communication over the wireless
channel. Subsequent work [18, 23] yielded 3-round SAS pro-
tocols.
2 Generally, SAS protocols are used in device pairing
2Recently, [27, 28] proposed even more ecient SAS proto-
cols which are used in several pairing methods we evaluated.settings where either (1) the OOB channel is used to trans-
mit something (i.e., the SAS itself) from one device to an-
other, or (2) the user is asked to compare two values emitted
by the respective devices.
Some pairing methods require the user to generate a se-
cret random value and somehow enter it into both devices.
Devices then perform authenticated key exchange, using the
user-generated secret as a means of one-time authentication.
Cryptographic protocols used for this purpose are called
Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols
[4].
2.2 Device Pairing Methods
Based on the cryptographic protocols described above, a
number of pairing methods have been proposed. They op-
erate over dierent OOB channels and oer varying degrees
of security and usability.
\Resurrecting Duckling" [31] is the initial attempt to ad-
dress the device pairing problem in the presence of MiTM
attacks. It requires standardized physical interfaces and ca-
bles. Though appropriate in the 1990s, it is clearly obsolete
today, due to the greatly increased diversity of devices. Re-
quiring a physical equipment (i.e., a cable) also defeats the
purpose and convenience of using wireless connections. An-
other early method is\Talking to Strangers"[1], which relies
on infrared (IR) communication as the OOB channel and re-
quires almost no user involvement, except for initial setup.
Unlike many other methods, it has been extensively tested
[2]. This method is deceptively simple since IR is line-of-
sight. Setting it up requires the user to nd IR ports on
both devices { not a trivial task for many { and align them.
Also, despite its line-of-sight property, IR is not completely
immune to MiTM attacks. The main drawback is that IR
has been largely displaced by other wireless technologies,
such as Bluetooth, and is available on very few modern de-
vices. However, we note that \Resurrecting Duckling" and
\Talking to Strangers" share an important advantage: they
require no user involvement beyond initiating the protocol.
Another early approach involves image comparison. It
encodes the OOB data into images and asks the user to
compare them on two devices. Prominent examples include
\Snowake"[10],\Random Arts Visual Hash"[24] and\Col-
orful Flag" [7]. Such methods require both devices to have
displays with suciently high resolution and their applica-
bility is therefore limited to high-end devices, such as lap-
tops, PDAs and certain cell-phones. These methods are
based on the above-mentioned protocol proposed in [1]. A
more practical approach (based on SAS protocols [23, 18]
and suitable for simpler displays and LEDs) has been inves-
tigated in [26].
In a more recent work, McCune, et al. [22] proposed the
\Seeing-is-Believing"method. In its original form, Seeing-is-
Believing requires a bidirectional visual OOB channel: each
device, one after the other, encodes OOB data into a two-
dimensional barcode which it displays on its screen and the
other device \reads it" using a photo camera, operated by
the user. At a minimum, Seeing-is-Believing requires both
devices to have a camera and a display for bidirectional au-
thentication. Thus, it is not suitable for lower-end devices.
We use the Seeing-is-Believing variant from [27, 28] which
only requires one device to have a camera. We refer to this
variant as \See-Believe" in the rest of the paper.
A related approach, called \Visual authentication based
on Integrity Checking"(VIC) has been explored in [27]. Like
Seeing-is-Believing, it uses the visual OOB channel and re-
quires one device to have a continuous visual receiver, e.g., a
light detector or a video camera. The other device must have
at least one LED. The LED-equipped device transmits OOB
data via blinking while the other receives it by recording
the transmission and extracting information based on inter-
blink gaps. The receiver device indicates success/failure to
the user who, in turn, informs the other to accept or abort.
We refer to this method as\Video"in the rest of this paper.
[25] developed a pairing method based on synchronized
audio-visual patterns. Proposed methods, \Blink-Blink",
\Beep-Beep"and\Beep-Blink", involve users comparing very
simple audiovisual patterns, e.g., in the form of \beeping"
and \blinking", transmitted as simultaneous streams, form-
ing two synchronized channels. One advantage of these
methods is that they require devices to only have two LEDs
or a basic speaker.
Another recent method is \Loud-and-Clear" (L&C) [11].
It uses the audio (acoustic) OOB channel along with vocal-
ized MadLib sentences which represent the digest of infor-
mation exchanged over the main wireless channel. There are
two L&C variants: \Display-Speaker"and\Speaker-Speaker".
In the latter the user compares two vocalized sentences and
in the former { displayed sentence with its vocalized coun-
terpart. Minimal device requirements include a speaker (or
audio-out port) on one device and a speaker or a display
on the other. The user is required to compare the two re-
spective (vocalized and/or displayed) MadLib sentences and
either accept or abort the pairing based on the outcome of
the comparison. As described in [11], L&C is based on the
protocol of [1]. In this paper, we use the L&C variant based
on SAS protocols [23, 18] to reduce the number of words
in the MadLib sentences. Depending on the required user
interaction, we call the two L&C variants as \Listen-Look"
and \Listen-Listen" in the rest of the paper.
Some follow-on work (HAPADEP [30, 12]) considered pair-
ing devices that have no common wireless channel, at least
not at pairing time. HAPADEP uses pure audio to trans-
mit cryptographic protocol messages and requires the user
to merely monitor device interaction for any extraneous in-
terference. It requires both devices to have speakers and
microphones. To cater to more basic settings, we employ a
HAPADEP variant that uses the wireless channel for cryp-
tographic protocol messages and the audio { as the OOB
channel. We call this variant\Over-Audio". It requires only
one device to be equipped with a speaker and the other
with a microphone. Also, it requires no entry of data and
no comparisons from the user.
An experimental investigation [33] presented the results of
a comparative usability study of four simple pairing meth-
ods for devices with displays capable of showing a few (4-8)
decimal digits:
Compare-and-Conrm: the user compares two (4-, 6- or
8-digit) numbers displayed by respective devices.
Select-and-Conrm: one device displays a single number.
The other displays a set of numbers and user selects
one that matches the number displayed by the rst
device.
Copy-and-Conrm: user copies a number from one device
to the other.Device/Equipment Requirements User Actions
Pairing Method Sending Device Receiving Device Phase I: Setup Phase II:  Exchange Phase III: Outcome OOB Channels
Visual Comparison Based
Image‐Compare
PIN‐Compare
Sentence‐Compare
Display +u s e r ‐input on both NONE
Compare:
two images
two numbers
two phrases
Abort or accept on both devices Visual
Seeing is Believing  (SiB)
See‐Believe
Display  + 
user‐input
Photo camera +  
user‐output 
NONE
Align camera on receiving device 
with displayed barcode on sending 
device, take picture
Abort or accept on sending 
device based on receiving device 
decision
Visual
Visual Integrity Code (VIC)
Video
LED  + 
user‐input
User‐output +
Light detector or 
video camera
NONE
Initiate transmittal of OOB data by 
sending device, align camera  or 
light detector on receiving device.
Abort or accept on sending 
device based on receiving device 
decision
Visual
Loud & Clear (L&C)
Listen‐Look
Listen‐Listen
User‐input on both +
display on one & speaker on other, or
speaker on both 
NONE
Compare:
two vocalizations
Displayed phrase with vocalization
Abort or accept on both devices
Acoustic, or 
Acoustic+ visual
Button‐Enabled (BEDA) 
Vibrate‐Press
LED‐Press
Beep‐Press
User input +
vibration 
LED
beeper 
User output +
One button +T o u c h  or hold both devices
For each signal (display, sound or 
vibration) by sending device, press a 
button on receiving device
Abort or accept on sending 
device based receiving device 
decision
Tactile
Visual + tactile
Acoustic+ tactile 
Audio Pairing (HAPADEP)
Over‐Audio
Speaker + 
user‐input
Microphone + 
user‐output
NONE
Wait for signal from receiving 
device.
Abort or accept on sending 
device
Acoustic
Resurrecting Duckling Hardware port (e.g., USB) on and a cable Connect cable to devices NONE NONE Cable
Talking to Strangers IR port on both Find, activate, align IR ports NONE NONE IR
Copy–and‐Confirm
Display +
user‐input
Keypad + 
user‐output
NONE
Enter value displayed by sending 
device into receiving device
Abort or accept on sending 
device based on receiving device 
decision
Visual
Choose‐and‐Enter User input on both devices NONE
Select “random” value and enter it 
into each device
NONE
(unless synch. Error)
Tactile
Audio/Visual Synch.
Beep‐Beep
Blink‐Blink
Blink‐Beep
User‐input on both +
Beeper on each 
LED on each
Beeper on one & LED on other 
NONE
Monitor synchronized:
beeping, or 
blinking, or 
beeping & blinking 
Abort on both devices if no 
synchrony
Visual
 Audio
Audio + visual
Smart‐its‐Friends, 
Shake‐Well‐Before‐Use
2‐axis accelerometers on both +
user‐output on one
Hold both devices
Shake/twirl devices together, until 
output signal
NONE 
(unless  synch. error)
Tactile + motion
Figure 1: Feature Summary of Notable Device Pairing Methods
Choose-and-Enter: user picks a\random"4-to-8-digit num-
ber and enters it into both devices.
All of these methods are very simple. however, as shown
in [33], Select-and-Conrm and Copy-and-Conrm are slow
and error-prone. Furthermore, Choose-and-Enter is inse-
cure, since studies show that numbers selected by users ex-
hibit very poor randomness.
Yet another approach (BEDA) described in [29] involves
user pressing device buttons , thus utilizing the tactile OOB
channel. BEDA has several variants: LED-Button, Beep-
Button, Vibration-Button and Button-Button. In the rst
two variants (based on the SAS protocol [27]), whenever
the sending device blinks its LED (or vibrates or beeps),
the user presses a button on the receiving device. Each
3-bit block of the SAS string is encoded as the delay be-
tween consecutive blinks (or vibrations or beeps). Thus,
repeated button presses transmit the SAS from one device
to another. In the Button-Button variant { which works
with any Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE)
protocol [4] { the user simultaneously presses buttons on
both devices and random user-controlled inter-button-press
delays are used as a means of establishing a common secret.
In this paper, we refer to BEDA variants LED-Button, Beep-
Button and Vibration-Button as \LED-Press", \Beep-Press"
and \Vibrate-Press" respectively.
There are also other methods involving technologies that
are currently relatively expensive and/or uncommon on com-
modity devices. We briey summarize a few. [14] suggested
using ultrasound as the OOB channel. A related technique
uses laser and requires each device to have a laser transceiver
[20]. In \Smart-Its-Friends" [13], a common movement pat-
tern is used to communicate a shared secret to both devices
as they are twirled and shaken together by the user. A sim-
ilar approach is developed in \Shake Well Before Use" [19].
Both techniques require devices to have 2-axis accelerome-
ters. Although some new cell-phones (e.g., the iPhone) are
thus equipped, accelerometers are rare on many other de-
vices. Also, physical shaking/twirling is an activity unsuit-
able for delicate as well as stationary or large/bulky devices.
Methods Summary
Figure 1 summarizes our discussion of existing methods by
comparing their salient features. The following terminology
is used:
Sending/Receiving Device: applies to all methods where
the OOB channel is used in one direction.
Phase I: Setup: user actions to bootstrap the method.
Phase II: Exchange: user actions as part of the protocol.
Phase III: Outcome: user actions nalizing the method.
User-input: any means of user input, e.g., a button.
User-output: any user-perceivable means of output, e.g.,
an LED.3. SELECTION OF PAIRING METHODS
FOR OUR STUDY
As follows from our overview above, there exists a large
body of prior research on secure device pairing and many
proposed methods. As shown in Figure 1, there are about
20 notable pairing methods (counting variations). In the
course of performing extensive pilot tests, we determined
that only about half of all methods ought to be included
in a within-subject study, mainly to avoid user fatigue. We
therefore eliminated the following methods (at the bottom
of Figure 1):
Resurrecting-Duckling: obsolete, requires cables.
Talking-to-Strangers: obsolete, IR ports are uncommon.
Copy-and-Conrm: performed poorly in prior evaluations
due to high user error rate.
Choose-and-Enter: performed poorly in prior evaluations
due to low security.
Simple Audio/Visual Synchronization (Beep-Beep, Blink-
Blink, Beep-Blink): performed poorly in prior evalua-
tions due to user annoyance and high error rate.
Smart-its-Friends, Shake-Well-Before-Use, Ultrasound- and
Laser-based methods: require interfaces that are un-
common on many current types of devices.
All remaining methods were included in our study.
4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
4.1 Apparatus
We used the two Nokia cell-phone models E51 and E61
3
as test devices. Both models have been released at least
two years ago and do not represent the cutting edge. We se-
lected these particular models to avoid devices with exotic or
expensive features and faster-than-average processors. An-
other reason for choosing these devices is the number of
commonly available interfaces, such as:
User-input: keypad (subsumes button), microphone, video
camera (subsumes photo camera)
User-output: vibration, speaker (subsumes beeper), color
screen (subsumes LED)
Wireless: Bluetooth, Wi-Fi and cellular (GSM)
In all our tests, Bluetooth was used as the (human-impercept-
ible) wireless channel; it is both inexpensive and widely
available. For methods that involve beeping, the cell-phone
speaker is trivial to use as a beeper. Whenever a button
is needed, one of the keypad keys is easily congured for
that purpose. An LED is simulated with a small LED-like
image glowing (alternating between light and dark) on the
cell-phone screen.
4
In comparative usability studies, meaningful and fair re-
sults can only be achieved if all methods are tested under
3See http://www.nokiausa.com/A4579382 and europe.
nokia.com/A4142101, respectively, for their specications.
4Even though both tested cell-phones have LEDs, there are
unfortunately no system calls to access them via Java MIDP.
similar conditions. In our case, the fair comparison basis
is formed by using (1) the same test devices, (2) consistent
GUI design practices (e.g., safe defaults), and (3) the same
targeted level of security for all methods. We also auto-
mated timing and logging to minimize administrator errors
and biases.
In order to achieve a unied test platform, our imple-
mentation of the eleven selected device pairing methods was
based upon the open-source comparative usability testing
framework developed by Kostiainen et al. [16]. It provides
basic communication primitives as well as automated log-
ging and timing functionality. However, we still had to im-
plement separate user interfaces and simulated functionality
for all tested methods in JAVA-MIDP. For all methods, we
kept the SAS string length (and secret OOB string length in
Button-Button) constant at 15 bits. It is well-known that
a 15-bit of SAS provides a reasonable level of security in
practice [34].
As implemented on our test platforms, each device pair-
ing method very closely approximates user experience with
a real implementation. The only real dierence is that our
versions of tested methods omit initial rounds of the underly-
ing cryptographic protocol over the (human-imperceptible)
wireless channel. However, this is completely transparent to
users.
The only methods noticeably dierent in our tests from
their real-world implementations were Seeing-is-Believing and
Video. Due to the diculty of implementing image and
video processing on cell-phones, we chose to simulate their
operations.
5 Specically, we saved the captured barcode im-
age in Seeing-is-Believing (and the recorded video of blink-
ing screen in Video) on the test device and manually ana-
lyzed later whether they had sucient quality to be image-
processed. From the user's perspective, the only dierence
is that these pairing methods do not fail, which is not prob-
lematic, since each user only tests these methods once. Also,
execution times of these two methods were penalized by a
few seconds in our tested implementations, since a system
security notication popped up each time the camera was
activated by our third-party testing software.
4.2 Subjects
The 22 study participants were adults, mainly from Irvine,
California. Most of them were University of California stu-
dents and sta. They were balanced by age group (18-25,
26-40, 41-and-over) and also separately by gender.
4.3 Procedures
We conducted a within-subjects experiment, in which all
participants were subject to the following procedures:
Background Questionnaire: Subjects were polled on
age, gender, ownership of mobile device, experience with
device pairing, and experience with dierent functionality
oered by mobile devices, e.g., messaging, gaming, music.
5The current CMU implementation of Seeing-is-Believing is
supported on Nokia models N70 [21] and 6620 [22] as receiv-
ing devices. The current Nokia implementation of Video
is supported only on Nokia 6630 [15] as the receiving de-
vice. Since we wanted to perform our tests on the same
devices throughout, neither implementation could be used.
Moreover, porting existing implementations onto our devices
was not viable since characteristics of cameras on these cell-
phones are quite dierent and each performs its own adjust-
ments to images and video, at the operating system level.Scenario Presentation: Subjects were asked to imagine
that they had just bought a new cell-phone and that a store
employee had already set up everything for them. When
they returned home they wanted to pair their new cell-phone
with their old one.
Experiment with pairing methods: Subjects sequen-
tially performed the following procedures for each of the
eleven tested methods.
1. They were given brief and simple instructions on the
next pairing method, both textually on one of the de-
vices and orally by the test administrator.
2. They tried pairing the devices with one of the tested
methods to establish a connection, and thereby per-
formed one of the following actions:
Beep-Press: When device A beeps, the user presses a
key on device B. The user then accepts or rejects
the outcome on A based on the output (green or
red LED) on B.
LED-Press: When an LED on A turns ON, the user
presses a key on B. The user then accepts or
rejects the outcome on A based on the output
(green or red LED) on B.
Image-Compare: Both A and B display a visual pat-
tern. The user compares the two patterns and de-
cides whether they match and enters the decision
into both devices.
Listen-Listen: Both phones \vocalize" a 3-word sen-
tence. The user decides whether the two sen-
tences match and enters the decision into both
devices.
Listen-Look: A displays a 3-word sentence, while B
vocalizes a 3-word sentence. The user decides
whether the sentences match and enter the de-
cision into both devices.
PIN-Compare: Both A and B display a 5-digit num-
ber. The user decides whether the numbers are
identical and enters the decision into both devices.
Sentence-Compare: Both A and B display a 3-word
sentence. The user has decides whether the sen-
tences match and enters the decision into both
devices.
Over-Audio: A transmits data over audio and B re-
ceives the transmission (records it). User conrms
that no other nearby source emits audio during
the process.
Seeing-is-Believing (See-Believe): With device A,
the user takes a photo of a barcode displayed by
B. Based on the output by A, the user either ac-
cepts or rejects the outcome on B.
Vibrate-Press: Whenever A vibrates, the user presses
a key on B. The user then accepts or rejects the
outcome on A based on the output (green or red
LED) of B.
Video: With device A, the user takes a video clip of
a blinking pattern displayed by B. Based on the
output by A, the user either accepts or rejects the
outcome on B.
To avoid order eects (particularly due to training and
fatigue), the sequence of performing the eleven pair-
ing methods tasks was counter-balanced using a Latin
Square design.
3. Subjective Perceptions: Subjects completed the
System Usability Scale (SUS) questionnaire [5], a widely
used and highly reliable 10-item Likert scale that polls
subjects' satisfaction with computer systems [3]. We
used the original questions from [5], but replaced\sys-
tem"with\method". Subjects also rated the perceived
security of each method, on the same scale.
4. Observable usability indicators: The following mea-
sures of observable usability indicators were taken for
each device pairing: task performance time, errors (if
any), and task completion (i.e., whether or not a con-
nection was established). Subjects were videotaped
during the pairing process (but were told beforehand
that only their hands and the devices would be cap-
tured).
5. Qualitative post-test questionnaire and inter-
view: Subjects completed a brief questionnaire that
asked them to name the three easiest and the three
hardest methods. It also asked them to pick two meth-
ods they would like to see on their personal device and
to indicate why (the options given were \easy", \se-
cure" and \fun"). Subjects could explain orally if they
preferred a method that was not tested.
For each subject, the entire experiment lasted between 30
and 45 minutes.
5. RESULTS
As described above, the following measures were collected
before and during the experiment, which form the within-
subjects usability measures and between-subjects factors of
our study:
Within-subjects usability measures: task performance
time, SUS score, perceived security, and task comple-
tion (a categorical variable).
Between-subjects factors: age group, gender, and prior
experience with device pairing.
Unless indicated otherwise, statistical signicance will be
reported at the 5% level (agged as \*" or \signicant", or
\<"\or >" in comparisons), and at the 1% level (agged as
\**" or \highly signicant", or \" or \" in comparisons).
5.1 Cross-correlation of usability measures
It is a common assumption in HCI that usability measures
are typically not independent of each other, but rather cor-
related. For instance, user satisfaction is assumed to be
negatively correlated to some degree with task performance
times. A broad meta-study by Frjr et al. [8] challenges
this view though. The authors recommend that \unless do-
main specic studies suggest otherwise, eectiveness, e-
ciency, and satisfaction should be considered independent
aspects of usability and all be included in usability testing."
We therefore performed linear cross-correlations of the
four usability measures. Table 1 shows the correlation coef-
cients and their statistical signicance.Figure 2: Eects of method on the four usability measures
Task Perceived
performance SUS security
time
SUS -0.383** -
Perceived Security -0.211** 0.512** -
Task completion -0.248** 0.126 0.039
Table 1: Cross-Correlation of Usability Measures
In the Social Sciences, coecients from -0.3 to -0.1 and
0.1 to 0.3 are generally regarded as small, and coecients
between -0.5 to -0.3 and 0.3 to 0.5 as medium [6]. In line
with the ndings of [8], we cannot regard any of our usabil-
ity measures as suciently correlated with others that they
could be justiably omitted. On the other hand, since the
measures are lowly correlated, it does make sense to also
look at them as a whole. In the following, we are going to
present an analysis of each usability measure individually,
and thereafter perform a cluster analysis based on a princi-
pal components analysis globally for all usability measures.
5.2 Individual Usability Measures
A Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance was performed
for each usability measure except for task completion (which
is categorical). The between-subjects factors are age group,
gender, and prior experience with device pairing, while the
within-subjects factor is method. Pairwise (unpaired one-
tailed) t-tests were performed between dierent levels of the
between-subjects factors on each within-subjects measure,
except for task completion that was subject to a Chi-square
test instead. Pairwise (paired one-tailed) t-tests between dif-
ferent methods were performed on each within-subjects mea-
sure. Pairwise (one-tailed) McNemar's Chi-squared tests
were performed between dierent methods on task comple-
tion.
5.2.1 Overview
Figure 2 shows the averages of these usability measures
for each method, normalized by the maximum average for
the respective measure which corresponds to 100% (coinci-
dentally, PIN-Compare fares best and thus represents 100%
along all usability measures). To improve the visibility of
the three-dimensional bar chart and to consistently asso-
ciate greater height with "good", the inverses of the task
performances times are plotted in the front layer. Again to
improve visibility, the methods are sorted from left to right
by inverse task performance time. This order should how-
ever not be interpreted as an overall ranking (except for the
top method PIN-Compare that tops all four measures).
A rst impression from Figure 2 is that a few methods
rank equally along all four usability measures, but that con-
siderable dierences along the dierent measures exist for
all other methods. This suggests that a ranking of methods
should consider all four usability measures rather than a
single measure only. Section 5.3 will present such a ranking
based on a Principal Component Analysis of all four mea-
sures. Another observation from Figure 2 is that the task
performance times of the dierent methods vary consider-
ably (ranging from an average of 15.7 sec for PIN-Compare
to 93.4 sec for Vibrate-Press), while the other measures show
a far lower variability. This suggests that we may want to
pay somewhat more attention to the task performance times
than to the other measures, since it is a very distinguishing
characteristic.Figure 3: Average task performance time by age group
5.2.2 Effect of Method
Repeated measures analysis of variance revealed that method
has a highly signicant eect on task performance time, SUS
score, and perceived security (p0.001 in all cases). Below
we will discuss the eects on these individual usability mea-
sures in more detail.
Task performance time: The following dierences between
the means of the fastest methods were statistically sig-
nicant (including their transitive hood):
PIN-Compare  Image-Compare < Listen-Look
PIN-Compare < Sentence-Compare < Over-Audio
Over-Audio < Listen-Listen < LED-Press
Listen-Look  See-Believe < Video-Compare
Listen-Look < Listen-Listen < LED-Press
Video-Compare < LED-Press < Beep-Press
Video-Compare < Vibrate-Press
Particularly noteworthy is the high signicance of the
dierence between the two fastest method, PIN-Compare
and Sentence-Compare.
SUS score: In terms of the assigned SUS scores, the fol-
lowing signicant dierences between means were ob-
served (including their transitive hood):
PIN-Compare > Sentence-Compare > Over-Audio
Sentence-Compare  Image-Compare > See-Believe
Over-Audio > Listen-Look > Listen-Listen
Listen-Look > LED-Press, Vibrate-Press
See-Believe > Video-Compare > Beep-Press
Perceived Security: The following groups of methods can
be distinguished, in decreasing order of their perceived
security:
1. PIN-Compare
2. Sentence-Compare, Over-Audio, Listen-Look
3. See-Believe, LED-Press, Vibrate-Press, Beep-Press,
Listen-Listen, Video
Dierences in the means between these groups were
found to be (highly) signicant, while dierence in the
means within these groups were not.
Task completion: The task completion rates were gener-
ally very high, and no noteworthy statistically signi-
cant pairwise dierence could be found.
5.2.3 Effect of Age
As one would expect, the 18-25 year age group exhibited
the shortest task performance time (30.6 sec on average).
Surprisingly, though, it was not the oldest age group but
rather the middle age group that had the longest task per-
formance time (26-40 years: 57.1 sec; 41 and above: 44.2
sec).
6 Figure 3 shows the task performance times of the
dierent pairing methods listed in the same sequence as in
Figure 2 (in contrast to this prior gure though, the task
performance times and not their inverses are plotted, and
hence short height is \good"). The youngest age group can
be seen in the front plane, the oldest age group in the mid-
dle plane, and the middle age group in the rear plane. The
time dierences between ages were particularly stark for the
following methods:
Beep-Press: means of age group 18-25: 39.4 sec; means of
pooled age groups 26-40 and 41 and above: 89.4 sec
(the dierence is highly signicant).
Vibrate-Press: means of age group 18-25: 68.4 sec; means
of pooled age groups 26-40 and 41 and above: 107.7 sec
(the dierence is approaching signicance, p=0.089).
6The dierence between the young and the middle group is
signicant at the p0.001 level, and the dierence between
the young and the old group signicant at the p=0.019 level.Figure 4: Average task performance time by gender
LED-Press: means of pooled age groups 18-25 and 41 and
above:
7 53.3 sec; means of age group 26-40: 96.9 sec
(the dierence is signicant).
Dierent age groups also had somewhat dierent task
completion rates: 94.4% on average for age group 18-25,
88.7% for the age group 26-40, and 86.3% for the age group
41 and above. The dierence between the young and the
old age group is signicant, and the dierence between the
young and middle age group approaches signicance (p=
0.074). Dierent age groups also exhibit dierences with re-
gard to perceived security. The security rating of the 26-40
year olds (7.1 out of 10 on average) is signicantly higher
than that of the 41 and above group (5.9 out of 10). The
18-25 year olds perceived the security somewhat in between
(6.3 out of 10).
5.2.4 Effect of Gender
Males generally assigned higher SUS scores than females
(average for males = 76.5, average for females = 66.07, p <
0.001), and also perceived the security of the pairing meth-
ods higher than females (average for males = 7.0, average
for females = 5.9, p < 0.001). Figure 4 shows that females
were generally also somewhat slower than males (average for
males = 39.4 sec, average for females = 47.1 sec, p=0.07).
The dierences in time were particularly stark for Listen-
Listen (average for males = 28.4 sec, average for females
= 53.5 sec, signicant) and for Vibrate-Press (average for
males = 76.9 sec, average for females = 109.9 sec, not sig-
nicant).
5.2.5 Effect of Experience
Figure 5 shows the average task performance time per
method, split by subjects who had prior experience with de-
vice pairing and those who had not. No overall signicant
eect of experience could be observed. This can probably be
regarded as an indicator that the pairing methods were easy
enough and the experimental instructions eective enough
that all subjects attained roughly the same skill level, inde-
pendent of prior experience. The sizable task performance
time dierence for LED-Press was not statistically signi-
cant due to enormous within-group variability.
7Note that this is a pool of all participants but for the middle
age group.
Figure 5: Average task performance time by expe-
rience
5.3 Cluster Analysis
A cluster analysis based on principal components was per-
formed to determine methods that are closely related with
regard on our usability measures. Table 2 lists the four
principal components that explain 100% of the variance in
the data. The rst component PC1 explains nearly 75% of
the variance, and the second component adds just 16.6% to
this. For all practical purposes, we may thus disregard PC2
through PC4 since they contribute little. Table 3 shows the
factor loadings of PC1. Not surprisingly, task performance
time loads negatively while all other factors show a positive
loading.
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4
Standard deviation 1.7292 0.8137 0.5307 0.2575
Proportion of Variance 0.7475 0.1655 0.0704 0.0166
Cumulative Proportion 0.7475 0.9130 0.9834 1.0000
Table 2: Principle Components of Usability Mea-
sures
x
Task performance time -0.47
SUS 0.56
Perceived security 0.53
Task completion 0.42
Table 3: Factor Loadings of PC1
Figure 6 shows the result of a cluster analysis on prin-
cipal components. Three clusters with six, two and three
connection methods, respectively, can be distinguished (an
alternative two-cluster solution would have merged clusters
2 and 3, but it makes less sense conceptually). Since Com-
ponent 2 can be largely disregarded, methods towards the
left side of Figure 6 can be regarded as\good"and methods
towards the right as \bad".Figure 6: Result of cluster analysis based on principal components
5.4 Post-experimental ranking of easiest and
hardest methods
As part of the exit questionnaire, subjects were asked to
rank-order the three easiest and the three hardest methods
in their view. The rank-order average across all subjects on
a 1 (easiest) to 11 (hardest) scale can be seen in Table 4.
Easiest 1. PIN-Compare 1.8
2. Sentence-Compare 2.1
3. Over-Audio 2.9
# ......... ...
9. Seeing-is-Believing 9.2
10. LED-Press 9.6
Hardest 11. Video 10.3
Table 4: Post-Experimental Ranking of Easiest and
Hardest Methods
6. DISCUSSION
As shown in Table 1, several highly signicant correlations
can be observed between our usability measures (p<0.001).
Particularly noteworthy is the medium-strong positive cor-
relation between perceived security and SUS score. Few par-
ticipants had a technical background sucient to objectively
assess the security of dierent device pairing methods. It
seems that they partly relied on their usability rating of the
methods instead.
We believe that Figure 6 is the clearest representation of
our study's overall results. In it, the two methods in Clus-
ter 2 (PIN- and Sentence-Compare) perform best overall,
and the three methods in Cluster 3 (Over-Audio, Image-
Compare and Listen-Look) come in as close second. How-
ever, viewed in isolation, PIN-Compare stands out against
all others.
The main common feature of all methods in the two top
clusters is that each requires a user comparison and a de-
cision based on presented visual information, except Over-
Audio which does not present any information to the user
and is thus least taxing. In the remaining cases, the compar-
ison is only between visual information, except for Listen-
Look where it is between visual and audio information. As
expected, the comparison of limited visual information (short
PINs in PIN-Compare) ranks higher in usability than meth-
ods that require comparing more extensive visual informa-
tion (Sentence- and Image-Compare
8). In contrast, methods
in the lower-ranked Cluster 1 require users to perform man-
ual actions (press buttons, take pictures or video clips) or
to listen to two successively spoken sentences, which is gen-
erally more taxing. Such added requirements seem to have
a negative eect on the usability measures in our study.
It is heartening that subjects' post-experimental ranking
of the easiest and hardiest methods (see Table 4) matches
exactly the ranking along the rst principal component of
our usability measures (see Figure 6). Subjects reported
that ease-of-use is by far the most important reason for them
to favor a method. They praised methods which involved\no
guesswork," and they liked \comparisons that require little
8The images generated by the Image-Compare method are
patterns and do not contain recognizable objects.eort". Only a few participants listed perceived security as
a preference criterion (mostly in tandem with \ease"), and
only one person cited \fun".
9
One direct and practical consequence of our cluster anal-
ysis is the following set of design guidelines, based on the
capabilities of the two devices involved:
1. If both devices have (even rudimentary) displays, the
advisable methods are, in order of preference: PIN-
Compare, Sentence-Compare and Image-Compare.
2. If only one device has a display, and the other audio
output, then Listen-Look is the best choice.
3. If neither device has a display, but one has audio out-
put and the other audio input (microphone), then Over-
Audio is recommended.
These guidelines can help manufacturers to implement meth-
ods best-suited for specic pairs of devices. On a powerful
mobile device (e.g., a high-end cell-phone or a PDA) with
rich I/O (and user) interfaces, the guidelines can also be
used to determine the optimal pairing method based on the
capabilities of the other device.
10
A practical consequence of our study of between-subjects
dierences is the following set of population-specic guide-
lines:
 Listen-Listen should be avoided, particularly for fe-
male users, who took nearly twice as long to use this
methods compared with males.
 Beep-Press is suitable for the younger age group only
(if at all), since the other age groups took more than
twice as long.
 LED-Press should be avoided, particularly for the middle-
age group, since this group took nearly twice as long
as other age groups.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The study described in this paper sheds some much needed
light on usability factors of many secure device pairing meth-
ods. Our experiment yielded numerous interesting results.
In particular, the study clearly points to some methods that
should be avoided altogether and several others (especially,
those based on visual comparisons) that are well-suited for
most users. It helps spot methods that are not well-suited
for certain subgroups of the user population with regard to
age, gender, and prior experience with device pairing. It also
helps identify methods best-suited for settings where one or
both device(s) lack displays.
However, there remain a number of issues left for future
work, such as:
 Since each secure device pairing method aims to pro-
tect the user(s) against MiTM attacks, a comparative
evaluation of all methods under such attacks needs to
be added. Individual methods vary in terms of fragility
and specics of possible MiTM attacks.
9This might be interpreted as indicating that tasks involving
security should not be perceived as \fun".
10To do so, either the user would have to be involved, or
devices would exchange their respective capabilities over the
wireless channel.
 On a related note, it might also be useful to investi-
gate various pairing methods in non-ideal settings, i.e.,
when the environment is not conducive to a specic
method. Examples include performing visual compar-
isons with insucient light, or using the audio channel
in the presence of ambient noise.
 Our study was conducted with the population of healthy
(physically unimpaired) adults. It would be quite valu-
able to perform similar studies with handicapped users,
e.g., vision- or hearing-impaired as well as those with
limited dexterity.
 Finally, our study only considered a situation in which
one user pairs two devices. When two users need to
pair their respective devices, the setting changes and
a separate eort must be made to evaluate usability
factors of the various methods.
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